Boy, I can really get used to these 2-1 games. Jack Chesbro vs. Cy Young circa 1904 … every night. Fun stuff.

I’m not saying he’s clutch (really, I don’t think he is/will be, going forward), but Scott Hairston has had a knack for the big hit since becoming a Padre.

You don’t need the numbers to tell you that, but check out his ‘07 play log, sorted by WPA. A bunch of huge hits there – six hits of at least .3 WPA. This year, counting tonight’s blast, he’s already had two +.3 WPA hits (both walk off homers). Since the start of 2007, wanna know how many of those hits (.3 WPA or higher) Mr. Clutch himself (Derek Jeter) has had? Two. David Ortiz? Two.

No, I’m not trying to prove anything by pointing out that Scott Hairston has had more “clutch hits” (defined arbitrarily by me, might I add) than a couple of perceived clutch/great hitters. Just showing that he’s has had an abnormal amount of key hits for the Padres over the past few years. In a backwards-looking sense, they’ve had tremendous value. They’ve also been a lot of fun to watch, too.  

Pedro goes tomorrow for the Mets (vs Ledezma). I watched his start vs. SF. According to the SNY gun, he was consistently in the low 90s with the fastball (he was in the mid-to-high 80s last year, iirc). Coming off an injury, I thought that was pretty impressive. Otherwise, I wasn’t overly impressed with his location or his secondary stuff. But he’s still Pedro Martinez … about as smart a pitcher as there is in the game.

2-1, anybody? 

One of the things I like to do is see how Bud Black is using his relievers. Fan Graphs makes that easy with leverage index. For this little analysis that I do, note that I use gmLI, which is the leverage index when the pitcher enters the game. I don’t think a pitcher should be able to create his own clutch situations or whatever. Or, more correctly, I don’t think we should worry about that when we’re evaluating how Bud Black uses these guys. If he brings in Kevin Cameron with a 3 run lead in the 8th, that’s a pretty low leverage spot. If Cameron proceeds to give up 5 hits in a row and ends up pitching in relatively crucial spot, well, Bud Black wasn’t planning on that. I suppose there could be an argument for using a different type of LI because he is leaving that guy in there, but for now I’m using this one. (edit: Now that I think about it, perhaps inLI would be better for next time, although I don’t think it would make much of a difference). Here’s a detailed description of leverage index from Tom Tango. So below we’ve got gmLI with innings and ERA in parenthesis:

Hoffman: 2.57 (8.7/7.27)
Thatcher: 1.84 (12.7/7.82)
Bell: …… 1.72 (15.7/2.87)
Meredith: 1.34 (12.7/4.26)
Rusch: ….. 1.04 (14.3/6.28)
Cameron: .95 (8.3/4.32)
Ledezma: .65 (15.7/1.15)
Gonzalez: .46 (3.3/10.80)

Hopefully you are quick to note that this season’s ERA is not all that useful, but I put it there anyway. What you would like to do in a perfect world is have your best pitchers at the top and your worst at the bottom. Here’s how I’d line it up — again, in a “perfect world” where you don’t owe anything to Trevor Hoffman.

Bell, Meredith, Hoffman, Thatcher, Cameron, Ledezma, Rusch, Gonzalez

Obviously, you could quibble here or there and I think the difference between Meredith, Hoffman, and Thatcher is quite small. If you can establish a hierarchy like this – preferably based on projections that incorporate minor and major league numbers, scouting data, etc — well, that’s great. But it really comes down to a situation by situation basis, and that’s where you can use superior knowledge of match ups to maximize the talent that you have. Thatcher, for instance, would obviously face a lot of lefties. Our projections might say that Meredith is better than Thatcher overall, but against, say, Todd Helton it would be Thatcher that would be the optimal choice.

I hear some people say that if Hoffman can’t close, what can he do. I don’t really get that. In my utopian bullpen, he wouldn’t be the “closer” because he isn’t the best overall pitcher. That doesn’t mean he can’t be a valuable guy in the 7th and 8th (or 6th, or 9th, or extra innings). And you know his best pitch is the changeup. Who does he do best against? Fly ball, power hitting righties? Pitch him against them.

Anyway, at this point of the season, this stuff is probably somewhat fruitless. But I wanted to take a look at how Buddy’s been using the relievers. He seems to have them is pretty solid order, considering that I expect Hoffman to continue to close no matter what. I would expect (er, hope) that Bell rises to number #2 and that the gap between Bell and Hoffman gets much smaller. I presume those things will happen.

By the way, who do you think has the highest gmLI so far? Yeah, Hoffman (well, that’s if you discard Mike O’Connor’s 1 inning).

Back in January I said, “I’ll remind you when the actual voting starts.” Well, here you are. Tango has it all ready to go. I think the good hitters will win (i.e., the best hitter from each team), but it’ll be interesting to track it throughout the season.

Tango is setting up an interesting little study over at his blog.

Ask people to select, for their team only, their #1 clutch guy, the one guy they want at the plate in crucial situations.  And I’m going to select the best overall hitter, regardless of their perceived clutchiness.  If it turns out to be the same guy (e.g., for the Cardinals, it’ll be Albert Pujols), I’ll select the #2 clutch guy and my #2 best overall hitter.

They are still ironing out the details, but I’ll be sure to remind you when actual voting starts. Anyway, it will be an interesting look at whether or not people can identify clutch hitters (I’m guessing they can’t). When the time comes, I think I know who to go with for the Pads, but I’m keeping my vote private ; )

When I’m stuck at college with a day to wait for my last final (and sick), I always looks at how relievers are used : ) You can get all of these stats at Fangraphs – I’m pretty much just extracting the data and putting it here. Okay, so here’s how each team in the NL West used their pen. I’m counting any reliever with over 20 innings and I’ve listed gmLI (leverage Index when the pitcher enters the game - here is an article by Tango on LI), ERA, FIP, and WPA. ERA definitely isn’t great for relievers (and it’s not even great for starters), but I’m listing it anyway. FIP uses k’s, walks, and homers to estimate ERA — it’s better than ERA because it takes out the BABiP/stringing hits component, but it’s far from perfect (again, especially with relievers). I also don’t believe it is park adjusted, so keep that in mind. WPA is Win Probability Added and is an estimate of how many wins a player contributes based on how that player changes his team’s win probability.

Basically, a manager wants to use his best relievers in the highest leverage situations. The tough part for managers is that they can’t just rely on one year of ERA or something like that. Since that’s such a small sample and ERA, as we’ve mentioned, isn’t very good, they want to use something else (like some fielding independent metric over multiple years). I don’t have that here, but we’ll discuss it a little bit as we go along. Let’s start with the Padres:

(innings, LI, ERA, FIP, WPA)
Trevor Hoffman  ….. 57.3 … 2.08 … 2.98 … 2.90 … 1.03
Heath Bell …………… 93.7 … 1.50 … 2.02 … 2.46 … 4.12
Scott Linebrink …….. 45 … 1.62 … 3.80 … 5.11 … 1.11
Cla Meredith ……….. 79.7 … 1.31 … 3.50 … 3.45 … -.80
Joe Thatcher ………… 21 … .1.21 … 1.29 … 3.30 … .07
Justin Hampson …… 53.3 … .80 … 2.70 … 3.24 … .36
Doug Brocail ………… 76.7 … .86 … 3.05 … 4.45 … 1.25
Kevin Cameron …….. 58 … .60 … 2.79 … 3.34 … .85

Total — 549.6 … 1.12 … 3.06 … 7.88 (no team FIP here and this is now pLI … per PA)

Bell was pretty clearly the best guy in the pen last year and he probably is going forward too. If the game was played without an sentimental aspect at all, he would probably be the closer (or at least pitch in the highest leverage situations). With all that Hoffman has done in a San Diego uniform, I’m guessing he’ll remain the closer if he continues to pitch well, which he has done. But I wouldn’t be surprised to see Bell get some save opportunities next year either. I’ve talked about Cameron before. Black just didn’t trust him at all. His FIP actually wasn’t bad because he didn’t allow a homer, but that’s certainly a bit of an aberration. I mean, pitchers just don’t throw 58 innings without giving up homer … on the plus side, his ground ball rate was 48.5% last year and his minor league hr/9 was .41. If he continues to pitch well, I’m sure Buddy will start to use him in more critical situations, but I can’t fault him too much for his usage last year.

Brocail was another guy who looked like a fine pitcher (3.05 ERA), but was probably used properly. His BABiP last year was .251 (.304 career) and his k/9 was ugly at 5.05. He was still able to pitch well enough in key spots (and rack up innings) to accumulate 1.25 WPA, which was third among Padre relievers. Overall, it looks like Black did a pretty solid job. He probably could have gained a bit of value by switching up how he used Hoffman and Bell, but like I said earlier, his hands are kind of tied there. 

One more thing on the Padres before we move on to the other NL West clubs. Another way to look at how a reliever was used is to look at his LI in each appearance. In the chapter “Leveraging Relievers” in The Book, they identified an LI of .70 as a point where players have little impact on a game — and therefore ace relievers should certainly not be used. They also said “Managers should strive to bring their aces with a leverage of at least 1.50, even in the 8th inning … .” Let’s take a look at Hoffman and Bell, the Padres two ace relievers. Hoffman was “wasted” (LI under .70) in 13% of his outings and he was used properly — with an LI over 1.50 — in 61% of his outings. Bell – 25% of his outings under .70; 43% of his outings over 1.50. With Hoffman there are a lot of wasted appearances that were actually 3 run save situations, as you may expect. Anyway, The Book found that from 1999-2003, managers used ace relievers 20% of the time in under .70 LI situations. So Black was actually quite a bit better than average here. The guy he can possibly improve on is Bell, since he is most likely the better of the two aces. Of course there are only so many high leverage spots to go around …

Dodgers

(Inn, LI, ERA, FIP, WPA)
Saito ……………….. 64.3 … 1.81 … 1.40 … 2.53 … 4.27
Broxton …………… 82 … 1.38 … 2.85 … 2.69 … 1.37
Proctor …………….. 32 … 1.15 … 3.38 … 5.26 … .32
Billingsley ………… 35 … .97 … 3.09 … 3.98 … .55
Tsao … …………… 24.7 … 1.09 … 4.38 … 4.58 … .42
Beimel …………… 67.3 … 1.14 … 3.88 … 3.35 … 1.37
Seanez …………… 76 … .83 … 3.79 … 4.21 … .15
Hendrickson … .46.3 … .79 … 3.69 … 4.02 … .60
Hernandez …….. 20.3 … .86 … 6.64 … 5.96 … -.89
Houlton …………. 28 … .56 … 4.18 … 4.77 … -.08
Tomko ………….. 24.7 … .71 … 6.57 … 4.52 … -.83

Total — 533 … .97 … 3.82 … 6.26

It appears that Grady Little did a pretty decent job of lining up the pen last year. One thing that stands out is Saito’s sensational performance — and his relatively low leverage index of 1.81. I mean this is a guy you definitely want to reserve for key spots, especially when he only gives you 64 innings and your pen isn’t as deep as the Padres’. Well, by the looks of it, he was used pretty poorly. A whopping 30% of his appearances came with an LI under .70. Only 49% came with an LI over 1.50. Take a look at one game he was used in. Now he hadn’t pitched since like 5 days before that game, but you’ve got to be able to find a better time to get him some work, no? We’ll have to keep an eye on how Torre uses Saito. There’s some value to be gained there and it has nothing to do with Saito pitching any better …

Diamondbacks

(Inn, LI, ERA, FIP, WPA)
Valverde … 64.3 … 2.01 … 2.66 … 3.54 … 2.20
Lyon ………… 74 … 1.54 … 2.68 …. 3.40 … 2.80
Pena ………… 85.3 … 1.40 … 3.27 … 4.21 … 2.56
Slaten … ……. 36.3 … 1 … 2.72 … 4.25 … -.24
Medders …. 29.3 … .75 … 4.30 … 7.36 … -.76
Cruz …………… 61 … .74 … 3.10 … 3.66 … .55
Nippert ……… 45.3 … .51 … 5.56 … 4.02 … .38
Gonzalez …….. 40.3 … .65 … 5.58 … 5.22 … .50

Total — 483 … 1.07 … 3.95 … 7.48

There was quite a bit written about the D’backs pen last year. Jaffe’s idea was that the back of Arizona’s pen was awful last year and that helped explain why they destroyed their pythagorean projections. I just looked at the worst combination of innings I could get with Arizona’s relievers … I got 78 innings and a 8.84 era. That looks to be worse that the average team but I’m not sure how much there is to the theory. Anyway, it does look like another pen that was used well. This isn’t rocket science after all. It is interesting to see how some of their WPA’s shake out. Take Gonzalez for example– he was pretty awful with a 5.58 ERA yet somehow he managed to pick up .50 WPA. How? If you look at that last link, you can see his game log. He pitched well in the most crucial situations and he pitched poorly when it didn’t matter much. Like when he gave up 6 runs on July 1st to the Giants … It was already a blowout when he entered the game, therefore those 6 runs only cost him -.16 points in WPA. One way to outperform your ERA WPA-wise is to suck when it doesn’t matter and to pitch well when it does. Maybe there’s something to that when explaining the diversion from their pythag. record. It’s not that they were just bad. They were good when it mattered and bad when it didn’t. Same thing with Nippert. I don’t know … on to the Giants.

Giants

(Inn, LI, ERA, FIP, WPA)
Hennessey … 68.3 … 1.83 … 3.42 … 4.50 … .39
Wilson ………. 23.7 … 1.81 … 2.28 … 3.24 … .84
Correia ………. 55.7 … 1.21 … 4.20 … 4.02 … -1.37
Messenger …. 40.7 … 1.40 … 5.09 … 3.98 … -1.48
Taschner …….. 50 … 1.36 … 5.40 … 4.00 … -.20
Sanchez ……… 35.7 … .82 … 5.30 … 4.72 … .00
Atchinson … …30.7 … 1.01 … 4.11 … 4.77 … -.48
Kline …………… 46 … .1.19 … 4.70 … 4.33 … .65
Chulk ………….. 53 … 1.06 … 3.57 … 3.29 … .18
Misch …………. 20.7 … 1.34 … 2.18 … 3.92 … -.36

Total — 485 … 1.17 … 412 … -1.80

Overall, their LI (per PA) is higher as a group than any other team in the division (1.17). But the pen really isn’t that good … and it isn’t that bad either. They seem to have a lot of average to slightly below average guys. And don’t forget that they had balkin’ Benitez for 17 innings too. Anyway, to me it looks like they need one real ace to turn to when the game is on the line. Maybe Brian Wilson is that guy?

Rockies

(Inn, LI, ERA, FIP, WPA)
Fuentes … 61.3 … 1.54 … 3.08 … 4.11 … -.95
Corpas ……. 78 … 1.35 … 2.08 … 3.56 … 2.71
Julio ………. 52.7 … 1.27 … 3.93 … 4.72 … -.21
Affeldt ……. 59 … 1.25 … 3.51 … 4.13 … -1.38
Hawkins … 55.3 … 1.16 … 3.42 … 4.43 … -.47
Herges …… 48.7 … 1.16 … 2.96 … 3.96 … 1.81
Buchholz ….. 50 … .99 … 2.70 … 3.71 … .10
Martin ……. 25.3 … .47 … 4.91 … 5.62 … -.39

Total — 528.7 … 3.85 … 1.10 … .19

Let’s go back to the “ace test” with Corpas. 30 of his 78 appearances came with an LI under .70 (that’s 38%). Only 40% came with an LI over 1.50. That is pretty  poor use of an ace if that’s what the Rockies believe he is. Of course a lot of that is due to the fact that they went with Fuentes as the closer for a while. It looks to me like Corpas is better than Fuentes, but it’s not a blowout by any means. Still, there’s no reason to pitch him in so many meaningless situations.

That’s it for this little look at reliever usage. It looks like the teams had their best pitchers lined up pretty neatly, but there is still probably a lot of value to be gained in reliever usage. For instance, The Book proposes a 2.30 LI for ace relievers. In the division, only Valverde and Hoffman had LI’s over 2 and they were not even close to the 2.30 mark. Teams are still using their ace relievers in too many non-crucial situations that seem important … or are forced into seeming important because of silly save rules. 

5 reasons to keep Mike Cameron; 5 reasons to let him go - Good piece by the folks over at the the UT assessing whether or not to keep Mike Cameron. It’s nice to see an approach that looks at both the negatives and the positives of a prospective move.

I’ll take issue with the second reason to keep him, though:

2. He’s clutch. Since 2005, no major league center fielder can match Cameron’s batting average (.302) or slugging percentage (.554) with runners in scoring position.

When talking about clutchness, you can’t just pick certain stats to make a case (at least, imo). They mention his good numbers with runners in scoring position, which is certainly, in general, “clutch.” However, how clutch is a double with men on second and third in a 10 run ball game?

If you look at Cameron’s numbers in, say, late and close situations, they are the total opposite:

2007: .226/.337/.398
2006: 176/.324/.275
2005: .249/.314/.391

Yea, not so clutch anymore.

The best way, at least that I know of, of measuring a players clutchness is to look at their “clucthiness” measure over at fangraphs. That’s the case because it looks at how many wins a player adds due to clutch or timely hits (by leverage index) over their normal batting line (in OPS wins). So if there’s a “clutch hit” to be had in the 5th inning, and Cameron picks it up, he’ll get credit for it. At the same time, if he gets a single in the 9th with bases loaded in a 8 run game, he’s not going to get a lot of credit, if any, in his clutch score (and in that situation, the UT article is essentially saying it’s a clutch hit). So here is his clutch score since 05:

07: +.06
06: -.77
05: .09

Since 2002, he’s actually -4.02 wins in the clutchiness measure. If anything, he’s not clutch! With knowledge in hand that clutch hitter’s don’t really exist, I’d definitely hesitate to use clutch performance at all in deciding whether or not to bring back Cameron. But I certainly wouldn’t use it as an argument in his favor.

Courtesy of the fantastic Fan Graphs (by WPA).

• grounded out to third (-.141)
• struck out swinging (-.141)
• grounded into dp (-.132)
• grounded into dp (-.118)
• flied out to center (-.110)
• struck out (-.110)
• flied out to center (-.110)
• stuck out looking (-.110)
• struck out looking (-.109)
• caught stealing (-.096)
• fouled out to first (-.093)
• flied out to center (-.092)
• flied out to center (-.092)
• flied out to center (-.092)
• flied out to first (-.091)
• grounded into dp (-.084)
• struck out swinging (-.082)
• fouled out to first (-.081)
• struck out swinging (-.078)
• caught stealing (-.076)

Strike out variety: -.52
In play: -1.236
On the bases: -.172

Total (these 20 outs): -1.928
Remaining negative plays:  -10.192

This is more of Tim Wakefield fastball, get-me-over fastball type post (more on that later). I’m not sure there’s much here to work with, as it is more just for fun.  First off, you’re working with the WPA (and it’s assumptions), which uses historical averages, rather than the exact, specific situations (i.e., Livan Hernandez on the mound and Adrian Gonzalez at 3b). So, rather than actual win probability added (or subtracted in this case), it’s more like “generic” WPA, based on historical averages. On that note, a costly out may be followed by a home run, and for the most part, be erased. Finally, selecting the bottom 20 was just an arbitrary cutoff and holds no real significance whatsoever.

Anyway, the next time someone says, “those Cammy k’s were killer in the clutch,” you can come back with “those fly outs to center didn’t help either!”

******

Just a few random, blog related notes. I can’t use firefox at school, but I’m using it now. I notice some things that I don’t with IE, like the graphs extending into the sidebar. If you ever notice anything with any browser, please let me know and I’ll check it out.

Also, I don’t have a lot of time now, so I may not post much until later next week (I know, seriously, like maybe two people really care).  I’m home now for the week and then I have a huge project due thursday of next week. I’m interested in looking into Cameron’s k’s more in depth and of course my exclusive, cutting edge, critically reviewed top 30 prospect list is going to be making its annual appearance ; ) I may wait on running that until late next week to get a little more research in and not rush it. No need to really, with the whole winter in front of us. So expect posting to be a little lighter than usual over the next few days. Then again, unexpected time may present itself and I may make a flurry of posts … kind of reminds me of this:

Shoeless Joe Jackson: The first two were high and tight, so where do you think the next one’s gonna be?
Archie Graham: Well, either low and away, or in my ear.
Shoeless Joe Jackson: He’s not gonna wanna load the bases, so look low and away.
Archie Graham: Right.
Shoeless Joe Jackson: But watch out for in your ear.

More importantly, have a great Thanksgiving!

Before making my post on the bullpen, I was poking around through baseball reference. This was the first time I noticed the innings/score appearance matrix (check at the bottom of a player’s game logs page … here is Cameron’s). Now you can easily see when a reliever entered the game (i.e., the run differential and inning). Cameron entered 4 times with a tie. He never once entered the game with a 1 or 2 run lead. 27 of his 48 appearances came when the Padres were either ahead or behind by 3 runs.

Looking at fangraphs’ leverage index, Cameron was used in the least important situations of a Padre with at least 15 innings pitched (.60 LI). We already knew that he wasn’t used in many clutch spots and this just drives home the point.

Now, if you didn’t know anything about Kevin Cameron you would probably expect that he had a high ERA last year. Somebody has to eat up these innings, right? That’s not the case. His era was 2.79 and below the Padre bullpen average of 3.06 (actually higher if you take out Cameron). So why wasn’t he used in big spots? Well, obviously, Bud Black, management, etc. didn’t think he was truly a 2.80 era pitcher. If there’s one thing we know about relievers, it’s not to put too much emphasis on one year of performance. Also, when attempting to assess their performance, we shouldn’t put too much emphasis on plain old earned run average.

I’ll leave it up to Kevin Towers and co. to determine Cameron’s true talent level going forward. We know that Towers does a great job of picking up underrated relievers on the cheap. What does he do when he may have an overrated one on his club?

Is a trade looming? As always, we’ll have to wait and see.

I’ll have a post up on all of the recent roster moves soon, but I wanted to check in on the pen again. The last time we looked was July 6th, and here’s how the pen stacked up by leverage index back then (with their LI from June 13th in parenthesis):

Hoffman: 2.33 (2.39)
Linebrink: 1.66 (1.58)
Bell: 1.42 (1.35)
Meredith: 1.37 (1.43)
Hampson: .87 (.80)
Cameron: .65 (.82)
Brocail: .57 (.66)

Now, it’s been almost a month, so let’s see if anything interesting pops up.

Hoffman: 2.33
Linebrink: 1.53
Bell: 1.44
Meredith: 1.17
Ring: .86
Hampson: .83
Brocail: .62
Cameron: .54
Thompson: .52

So there were really no huge changes over the past 20 something days, as we’d probably expect. It looks liked some of Linebrink’s crucial spots went elsewhere. Meredith has been a case study in the effect that balls in play can have on a relievers yearly numbers. Last year his BABiP was .203, while this year it sits at .362. He went from the extremely lucky side of the spectrum to the extremely unlucky side in one year. His peripherals are really quite similar to last year. Check it out:

k rate (percentage of total batter faced)
06: 20%
07: 16%

bb rate
06: 3%
07: 5%

hr rate
06: 1.6%
07: 1.8%

gb rate (percentage of balls in play)
06: 69%
07: 71%

He’s been relatively similar pitcher with his peripherals,  yet his ERA is about 3 runs higher. There is a lot of luck and randomness involved in both last year and this year (and you’d expect more of that in smaller 50 inning samples). Meredith’s true talent probably, almost definitely,  lies somewhere between this year and last. He’s a perfect example of why relievers are so tough to predict.

I always feel compelled to talk about Cameron in these posts. Make no mistake, he’s been pretty darn good. He has a great k rate, he keeps the ball down, and he’s yet to allow a homer. He also has 19 unintentional walks in 156 total batters faced (12%). That’s just too high. At some point, I think you do have to start letting pitch some more critical innings, but I generally like the way Black has handled him so far. Cameron isn’t close to a 1 era pitcher when he steps out onto the mound, and Bud knows it. And he doesn’t treat him like one.

Now, who takes Linebrink’s innings? Afterall, he was the second most leveraged reliever on the club. Well, I guess the better question may be … if you could create a pecking order in the pen, by leverage index, what would it be? Here’s mine:

Hoffman
Bell
Meredith
Thatcher
Cameron
Hampson
Brocail

We’ll wait and see with Hensely. The list isn’t concrete or anything. Of course you’d play match-ups and worry about rest and what have you. It also doesn’t mean I think Bell should be the “8th inning guy”. I think, optimally, he should be used in the second most important situations, overall. Sometimes, that may come in the 6th, 7th or 9th inning…

Adrian Gonzalez has been more valuable this year than last. If I told you that, you wouldn’t believe me, right?

This year he’s hit .261/.335/.470 and last year, in the same ballpark, he hit .301/.362/.500. There is no way he could be more valuable this year, right? Well, wrong, at least kinda. This year his WPA (win probability added, calculated by fangraphs) is 2.04. Last year it was a much lower 1.02. You might wonder how the hell that happened. It’s all about clutch performance. Gonzalez’s “clutchiness” this year is 1.31 (4th in all of baseball!) which is a complete turn around from the -.64 that he put up last year. Before we go any further, let’s look at how these things are calculated.

WPA is just win advancement minus loss advancement. A player gets credited for positive events and debited for negative ones. Say, a 2 run single to in the game in the 9th is worth .4 wins. The player is credited with .4 win advancements. An out in the first inning trailing 5-0 is worth -.02 loss advancements. The player is “credited” with -.2. Add all of these up at the end of the year to get WPA. Just as a note, I made those numbers up.

Clutchiness is basically how many wins the player added over what would be expected. The formula is WPA - (OPS Wins * pLI). OPS Wins is .025 * (1.7 * obp + slg - 1) * PA. The numbers are also park adjusted. pLI is leverage index per plate appearance. Usually for hitters it’s around 1.

Here are Adrian’s PA’s sorted by leverage index. This is what he has done in his 5 most crucial PA’s:

Double, fly out, double, double, sac fly. Pretty clutch, ey? In those 5 PA’s his WPA is .795. Last year in his 5 most critical PA’s he singled, walked, struck out, singled, and GIDP for a total WPA a .292 … a pretty large difference when we’re just talking about 5 times at the plate. Anyway, this is just cherry picking, as you obviously look at all PA to determine this stuff.

The merits of WPA (and “clutchiness”) are something that certainly could be discussed, as could the implications of this on any evaluation of Gonzalez. I don’t really think he’s been “better” this year. He’s just leveraged his performance so that, in a sense, he has provided more value, by WPA’s standards, to the Padres. Going forward, you’d probably regress his clutch performance a long way toward average and evaluate him like that. Afterall, how does a player go from -.82 clutchiness from 04-06 to +1.31 clutchiness in 07. There’s just a lot of random flucuation involved.