by Myron Logan

I was thinking about the amateur draft the other day – both its impact on a major league franchises success and how proficient (or not) the Padres have been at it. I thought we’d take a look at each draft, year by year, starting in 2000 (because its recent enough to be somewhat relevant, but enough time has past to evaluate it). We’ll work upwards until recent years, and revisit later years if the series has any success.

Anyway, here’s my initial format. I’m going to split the draft up into three arbitrary sections: the top, the middle, and the rest. The top will consist of the first 300 picks, the middle will be the next 300, and the rest will be everybody after that (generally around an additional 600 picks). I’m also going to split each section into four groups: high school hitters, college hitters, high school pitchers, college pitchers. I’m going to place any player drafted out of a college, be it a junior college or as a junior, in the college bucket, just to simplify things a bit.

I will also provide a total WAR figure for each section, if any players drafted reached the bigs, so we can get a sense of the value they contributed to the major league club. And of course I’ll add some commentary. That’s the format for now, we’ll revise if needed. Suggested are of course always encouraged. (note: I’m not counting unsigned players: more on that in the commentary that follows).

There admittedly is not much context to these numbers, but I think they are still somewhat useful. We’ll gain a little bit of context, at least in terms of the Padres organization, as we go through the series.

The Padres drafted Mark Phillips, a left handed HS pitcher, in the first round (9th overall). Phillips responded with a 5.35 ERA in his rookie ball debut. His strikeout and home rate rates were tremendous throughout his minor league career, at 8.7 and .4, respectively. He simply could not harness any control, posting a walk rate approaching six. He disappeared from pro ball in 2003, but reappeared in an independent league in 2007 with Newark. He showed he was the same Mark Phillips, striking out one an inning and allowing just two homers in 32 innings, while walking almost eight batters per nine.

Phillips was a major disappointment, but the Padres second pick, a third basemen from Cal, Xavier Nady, has turned in a solid, if not spectacular, major league career. Nady has hit .280/.335/.458 in almost 2500 plate appearances.

The Padres fourth pick, a high school outfielder out of Louisiana, is a familiar name: Mewelde Moore. He has since gone on to have a pretty nice career in the NFL as a running back. In the minors, however, he struggled mightily, spending three seasons in rookie ball, and hitting .210/.294/.284. He did show glimpses of running back speed with ten steals in only 50 career games. While it is sort of a funny story, it is one heck of a miss for a fourth round pick.

In the 13th round, San Diego selected Justin Germano; so far he has logged 205 major league innings and a 5.27 ERA.

The Padres did select Chad Cordero, a RHP from Don Antonio High School in California, in the 27th round. However, they did not sign him. He was drafted by the Montreal Expos a few years later, where he went on to be a very good closer.

Overall, obviously, it is tough to come to too many conclusions based on this brief analysis. But, for the most part, this was not an extremely productive draft for the Pads. To put that first pick into perspective, five out of the top ten picks in 2000 did not reach the majors, so it’s not an absolute disaster. However, after Phillips came a bunch of better-looking options like Chase Utley, Adam Wainwright, and Kelly Johnson. Sure, hindsight is 20-20.

A bright spot was the selection of Xaiver Nady, who was probably the best pick in the second round of any MLB team. Nady went on to have some decent years in San Diego, then was converted into Mike Cameron in 2005.

After Nady, though, there was really nothing else. Of course, as alluded to above, there’s a lot missing here. One, is context; how good are most major league drafts? Two, there are a bunch of other potentially important factors ignored, like players that were used in trades, or valuable minor leaguers that provided something to the organization.

Anyway, we’ll look at the 2001 draft soon, and see how this one looks in comparison.

*thanks to Baseball Reference for the draft data and stats and FanGraphs for the WAR values.

by Mike Rogers

Last winter I took three separate looks at the San Diego Padres 2008 draft. I had started adjusting college offensive statistics for parks and strength of schedule to get a better feel for the true talent levels of the players drafted. You can see my methods here in an article that Myron Logan and I penned for Baseball Analysts. I haven’t changed much except the weightings in my “Score” column since that article. My “Score” is a hodge-podge formula that weights adjusted wOBA, adjusted Isolated Power, a small speed score, K and BB%’s, and runs above average. The runs above average is above the average hitter in that particular conference using the conference’s average park and strength of schedule ratings.

Unfortunately for me, the 2009 draft wasn’t as loaded as the 2008 draft was with college bats. Furthermore, the Pads didn’t take as many college bats this passed June as they did in 2008, so my scope of adjusted numbers isn’t as high as my previous breakdown. But, let’s not drag this out any more. Presented in the order by which they were drafted, here are the college bats the Padres took last June (and signed) that are in my current system (which includes 13 conferences that are the ACC, SEC, Sun Belt, Big West, Big East, Big Ten, Big 12, Pac 10, MAC, WAC, West Coast Conference, Moutain West, Conference USA).

Evaluations after the jump. . . Read the rest of this entry »

by Daniel Gettinger

Earlier in the week, Ben Davey asked whether the draft was fixable.  His post not only touched on a number of his concerns, but has also began to generate some interesting discussion in the comments.

Today at Fangraphs, Dave Cameron put forth a draft reform proposal that I believe should be seriously considered.  Rather than tweak the current system, Cameron suggests we just get rid of the entire thing.

He proposes replacing the draft with an auction similar to free agency.  Based on where teams finish in the standings, they would be allocated a budget they could not exceed.  The team would then be free to allocate the money in the manner they see fit.  International players would be included in the auction.

As Cameron explains:

The top tier teams who have been winning recently would receive small sums of money that would essentially take them out of the running for the premium talents. Given that the teams that finished in the bottom half would likely be willing to bid ~60-70% of their budgets on the top guys available, the Strasburgs of the world would probably command bonuses in the $7 or $8 million range, which the winning teams would not be able to match.

By giving each team a player acquisition budget, you also open up new strategies for teams to pursue. Like the international crop a lot more than the American kids? You could sign practically everyone you want with $10 or $12 million and skip the domestic players entirely. Want to load up on the best kids from your home state? Sign them all if you want. Think your team needs an infusion of pitching immediately? Bid on college arms and college arms only.

Cameron also proposes using revenue sharing dollars to create the budgets.  He notes that teams spent $160 million on signing their picks this year, so major league baseball could take something like $200 million from revenue sharing to make up the budgets for the auction.

I am still not sure what to think about that element of his proposal.  Cameron makes a good point when he writes that using revenue sharing money would ensure a “massive part of the revenue sharing money did not go into the pockets of the owners.”  At the same time, the whole point of revenue sharing is to help smaller market teams that are not capable of generating the same level of revenue as larger market teams. This system re-allocates revenue sharing dollars away from low-revenue teams, and towards low-win teams (there is however a good amount of overlap between the two).

Even if revenue sharing dollars were not used, I think some form of this system could work.  There are bound to be logistical issues, and because the total pot is capped, there is an element of unfairness towards the players.  But, this system is highly efficient in allocating talent, provides an advantage to the teams with the worst records, and subjects international players to the same process as those from the US and Canada.  I like it!

by Ben Davey

This seems like a weird sentiment to pose when for the first time in awhile the Padres actually signed ALL of their 1st 10 round picks, but the fact of the matter is the draft is severely flawed.   I am not just talking about the insane bonuses that are given or signability issues, but almost EVERY aspect of the draft, which makes me wonder… “Is it fixable?”

In other sports a player is drafted and before mini-camp starts he is signed.  Baseball is the only sport where the draft happens in the middle of the season.  Heck, when the draft happens some of the players are still playing in the CWS.  While this is already a slight problem it wouldn’t be a big deal if they were signed within a week of the draft.  Instead we have long holdouts.  and players who might as well have been drafted in the offseason because of the number of games they get in.   I know that Tate, Williams, and Sampson are all going to Peoria, but for example Eugene has already played 57 games this year.  That means that some draftees will have probably played in 60 games before our #1,2, and 4 picks play 1 game.

Even when they do arrive in Peoria and finally play, there are only 9 games left in the season!  Let me repeat: there are 9 games left in the season as of August 18th.

But is their a way to fix this aspect of the game?  MLB did attempt to do something about this a couple years ago when they got rid of the draft and follow players, but what they really needed to do is move the signing date to make it within a few weeks of the draft.  Make it the same day as the all star game (just a thought), but if you make it in mid July (or earlier) you force teams, advisers, agents, and players to start working right from the beginning.

We heard for over a month that Strasburg, Tate, and Ackley were not offered more than the initial contract that they were given when they were drafted.  That is an entire month that they could have played, but instead were sitting around, unsure if and when they would sign.  Force the teams to sign the players early, because like most of us it seems teams love to procrastinate.

Which brings me to my next thought.  The commissioners office.  Their slot bonuses are completely ridiculous because no one is forced to sign for that amount of money.  In football if the #4 pick signs for 10 mil and the #6 pick signs for 8 mil, chances are the #7 pick will sign for right around 9 mil.

In baseball you can have 6th round picks getting paid more than 1st round picks.  There are players who give ridiculous demands, and if they are not met, the player seems to have little problem with not signing.

Of course this is because unlike football or basketball, the MLB can draft high school players.   Because of this you have high school kids who would normally go in the first few rounds, but fall back to the mid rounds because of signability issues.

The thought then becomes will a team draft them knowing it might be a wasted pick unless they offer him 1st round money.  But at the same time, if you can get a 1st round talent in the 8th round isn’t that considered a steal?

Demands of the agent, players, and issues signing players before the deadline is arguably the biggest problem with the draft and something that I dont think they can fix.  If Bud Selig does make the signing bonuses extremely rigid then we will see a LOT fewer high school prospects, as those taken after the first few rounds can only be offered peanuts and will go to school in hopes of being a higher pick in a few years while earning their education.

If they limit how much a team can spend in total for the draft that would hurt the teams picking high in the draft and prevent them from doing much more.  Strasburg signed for 15 mil, which alone is more than some teams spent.  If there was a cap then Strasburg might be the only player signed by Washington this year (outside of rounds 20+), or they just are not able to offer him anywhere close to the 15 mil and he goes back in the draft next year.

Meanwhile, teams like the Yankees, Red Sox, etc… might have only signed their 1st round pick for a mil, which would then give them the opportunity to sign and draft more high school prospects or players with high demands, thus actually making it better to draft in the lower rounds.

I know there are a lot of other things to talk about including passing on players because of money, not being able to trade picks, and well, a bunch of other stuff.  But since I was talking about slot money I figured I would just mention the flaws of Bud Selig.

A lot of players including Sampson were, for all intensive purposes, signed a week or two ago, but Selig made it so that the signing wouldnt be official until the last day.  Why?  Because players signing for over slot money give other players leverage to ask for more money.

In that aspect it makes sense but at the same time, when there are only 2 weeks left in the minor league season, how important do you think doubling the number of games would have been for a lot of these minor league players?  I know Selig doesn’t like it but for the sake of the players who do sign, they need to announce it when it happens and not hold off.

There are a lot of things wrong with the draft, and despite that, the draft has steadily become more and more hyped over the past few years.

Five years ago when the Padres drafted Matt Bush, everyone who reads this might have known maybe 5-10 other players in the draft.  But now, at least speaking for myself and many others, I knew almost every name in the 1st round and many of those in the 2nd and 3rd rounds.

The draft is becoming a bigger spectacle which IMO is good for baseball, but MLB needs to make a lot of changes when the new CBA is put in place in the next 18 months.  Hype the spectacle, hype the event, but dont let almost 2 months of nothing happen before the creme of the crop are signed and finally play.

by Daniel Gettinger

Wow.  Now that the Padres have inked Tate, Williams, and Sampson, they have signed 13 of their first 14 picks.

Considering the team took some players who were looking for above-slot bonuses, I am somewhat surprised and very impressed.

I like that the team was willing to pay for talent.  Even players like Tate who receive multi-million dollar bonuses are huge bargains compared to what they would receive on the open market.

by Myron Logan

August 17th is a date that looms large for the San Diego Padres organization. The Padres have until then to sign their 2009 amateur draft picks, which include Donavan Tate (first round), Everett Williams (second round), and Keyvius Sampson (fourth round). All three are high school graduates and all three are expected to sign for more than MLB’s recommended slot bonus.

The Padres were almost universally praised in June for changing their draft strategy, which appeared to center around college players and safe signings (two things that often coincide). Breaking that mold, they picked high school prospects in three out of the first four rounds.

Drafting them is one thing, though, signing them is another. As mentioned, signing them is going to require more money than each respective draft position usually gets – in Tate’s situation, that could be as much as $3-4 million. I think there are two clear (quite obvious) reasons why signing these guys (at least two of them, including Tate) is essential for the Padres:

1. The best way to build a consistent winner is through drafting and developing. Young, cost-controlled players are huge for an organization. They provide both on-field value to the team (if they make the majors, of course) and trade value to bring in a proven player or two. The best way to assure that you have these type of players is to load up on talent – sure, sometimes you’ll miss, but when you hit, you’re getting a ton of surplus value.

2. The Padres need to send a message to the fans. With Jake Peavy’s contract out of town, there’s little excuse to not sign these draftees, especially Tate. If the new Padres regime wants to prove they are ready to contend, they have to spend money. There’s no better place to start than in the draft, especially with a rebuilding team.

I’m not worried about any of the three getting signed – I think they all will, and at least two will sign contracts. That said, I don’t want to see the uproar if Tate goes unsigned. It just won’t look good for the organization. In this lost year, we need good things to happen for a change. The draft was one of them – signing the draft picks will be another. .

by Daniel Gettinger

I was recently talking baseball with a friend who was quite worked up about the way major league baseball determines draft order.  While he recognized the worst teams should have a shot at the best players,* he also thought it was ridiculous that the Nationals have a good chance of having their mediocrity rewarded with both Stephen Strasburg and Bryce Harper.  My friend complained that the current system actually gives some teams an incentive to be as bad as possible.

*For the purposes of this discussion, lets abstract from the fact that due to bonus demands, the best players do not always go to the teams with the worst records.

Personally, I do not believe teams purposely tank games in order to improve their draft position. But my friend’s suggestion for reform stuck me as so fun, I don’t think it matters if the system must be changed. He proposed the implementation of an end of the year tournament in which the worst teams compete for the best draft picks.  After discussing the idea for a few minutes, we agreed on the following system:

1) The teams with the eight worst records are eligible for the tournament.  Every other team is slotted in the same manner they currently are (by reverse win-loss record).

2) The tournament will be single elimination

3) Every game will be played at the same site.

4) The team that wins the tournament gets the first pick in the draft.

Seriously, what is not to love about a tournament like this?  Fans of the worst teams get to watch their team play a few “meaningful” games for the first time in months.  Players are not any worse off.  At most they will have to play three additional games.  Vacation plans will only be pushed back a few days.  In addition, there is minimal travel since all the games will be played at the same site.

This tournament is solid fun, still ensures the worst teams get the best draft picks, and is not prohibitively expensive.  I would love to see something like it implemented in the near future.

by Mike Rogers

So, I’ve been absent ’round here, well, all year. But, with the MLB draft taking place last week, my forte comes a’callin’ again.

…But not quite yet.

Until then, Paul Depodesta’s taken a look at the 2008 Padres draftees over at his blog. I also took three looks of my own at the Padres college bats taken this time last year.

After perusing the numbers, I must admit that Logan Forsythe’s out-performed my expectations thus far. I thought James Darnell would be the better hitter, as I liked his power potential and his eye at the plate more than Forsythe’s. But, I’m happy to be relatively wrong as Darnell’s only slightly out-performing Forsythe, albeit at a lower level then Logan.

Allan Dykstra really has struggled thus far, but Depodesta notes that they’ve made some adjustments to his swing in Spring Training and that is possibly the cause. His plate discipline has been great thus far (19.5% BB rate), and I suspect that his power will come. I still like James Darnell the most out of the college bats that San Deigo took last year.

Now, as I said before, my college hitters numbers are on the way, but I don’t have an exact date as of yet (nor a real timetable, either). I have 199 hitters — most of which were draft eligible this year — updated with 2009 numbers. I need to flesh those out with the full conference data, and when I do that, I’ll be able to pen something on the college hitters San Deigo took last week. But I can give you a sneak peak.

The Padres top college bat taken in the 2009 draft was Miami (FL) Hurricane’s catcher Jason Hagerty. He had a breakout season in 2009. Of the 199 hitters I have stats for in 2009, Hagerty’s season came out 20th best as judged by my “score” ranking. He had an adjusted wOBA of .447 (26th best in my 2009 numbers), .306 adjusted Isolate Power (20th in my 2009 numbers), while walking 16.5% of the time and striking out 18.8% of the time in 260 plate appearances. The strikeouts are a little disconcerting, but from what I’ve read, he’s likely to stick behind the plate. So, you can live with some offensive short comings for a catcher, as their bats are often less potent and consistent then other position players.

The problem I’ve got with Hagerty is his past performance. I’m always a little leery of breakout players in their Junior seasons. Let’s peruse his 2008 numbers:

64.56 Score*
.358 adjusted wOBA
.220 adjusted IsoP
7.4% BB rate
25.9% K rate
162 PA’s

* = this score is slightly different then my 2009 score. For the 2008 and 2007 seasons, I have calculated an average wOBA for each conference and then adjusted that by the conference’s average park factor and strength of schedule. I use that to get a Runs Above Average number for each hitter in the conference. For instance, in 2008, the average adjusted wOBA in the ACC was .389 — Hagerty was 4.36 runs below the average ACC hitter in 2008. I take this into account in my score, but don’t for 2009 because I don’t have full conference data yet.

And his 2007 numbers:

22.78 Score
.233 adjusted wOBA
.023 adjusted IsoP
9.0% BB rate
27.0% K rate
100 PA’s

The average adjusted wOBA for ACC hitters in 2007 was .383. Hagerty was 13.02 runs below the average ACC hitter in 2007.

Now, these 2007 and 2008 numbers need to be taken with a barrell of salt. Combined, it’s just 262 PA’s, while he had 260 in 2009 alone. He was a utility man of sorts for his first couple of years before finally settling into the starting catchers role this year. So, sporadic playing time in his freshman and sophomore seasons may have been a big part of the bad numbers. That said, I am always a bit skeptical of players that have drastically improved statistics in their junior years. His improvement in the walk and strikeout department is a very good one and if that carries over to the pro game (assuming they sign him), then I think he’s got some offensive upside. As of now, his ability to stick behind the plate could be enough to get him to the majors as at backup backstop.

by Myron Logan

The Padres have garnered perhaps as much attention as any team for what appears to be a dramatic shift in draft-philosophy this year. Over the past few years, San Diego has consistently shown a preference towards taking college ball players in the amateur draft. For the most part, that has corresponded with the selection of guys with little “signability” issues; players that shouldn’t be too difficult to sign and will likely not demand over-slot money.

In the 2007 draft, for instance, they passed on high school right hander Rick Porcello and opted to sign Arkansas lefty Nick Schmidt. Porcello, a top talent, fell to the Tigers at #27 largely because of fear that he’d demand a large signing bonus.

The Padres strategy, at least from an outsider’s perspective, has appeared to have a couple of angles. One, college players are safer bets to reach the majors and at least turn into solid contributors. There is more reliable data on them, especially in the form of numbers, with most high school stats being close to useless. They are older and more mature, and generally they are a little easier to evaluate.

Secondly, since they have less options than their high school counterparts, college players are generally easier to sign (and cost less money). Schmidt, the junior from Arkansas, ended up signing for $1.3 million (recommend slot money). Porcello, on the other hand, signed for $3.6 mil, well above the recommended slot ($1.2 mil). A similar example, from the same draft, is Andrew Brackman, who fell to the Yanks at #30 and signed for $3.3 million.

While the Padres have gradually improved their farm system year-by-year, slowly the criticism started to mount. College players are fine, but the Padres were getting too college centric, the critics said. They had a farm system full of solid players, but most of them with little upside or star-potential.

In this 2009 draft, the Padres have surprised a lot of people by taking two high school outfielders with their first two picks, Donavan Tate and Everett Williams. In the fourth round, they nabbed highly touted prep pitcher Keyvius Sampson. Three high school players in the first four picks is not what anybody was anticipating, with rumors that the Padres were considering Vanderbilt lefty Mike Minor – of the Nick Schmidt mold – swirling.. All three HS players taken are expected to be somewhat tough to sign, and will probably demand above-slot money.

I thought it would be interested to look at the Padres draft selections since 2006 to really get a sense of their preferences. I separated the draft into three ‘tiers’ and counted up how many college hitters, college pitchers, high school hitters, and high school pitchers San Diego selected in each tier. Note: I counted junior college players in the college bucket, and I didn’t determine whether or not the Padres signed the player. It’s not a detailed analysis, but I think it paints a decent picture:

First Tier (Rounds 1-10)

From 2006-08, the Padres picked 35 college players and just 7 high schoolers in the first 10 rounds. This year, they picked 6 college and 4 HS – and, as mentioned previously, 3 of the first 4 were from HS. It certainly appears to be somewhat of a shift.

Middle Tier (Rounds 11-30 approx.)

In the middle of the draft, the Padres have a (recent) history of being tremendously college-heavy. It didn’t change this year, as 19 of the 20 picks came from the college ranks. Overall, from 2006 through 2009, 67 of the 74 ( 91%!) selections have been college players.

Late Rounds (Rounds 31-end)

The bottom of the draft has been all over the place. In 2006, the Pads loaded up on high school players late. But in 2008 and ‘09 combined, they’ve been very college heavy (78%).

Overall, the change in philosophy, if there is one, appears to have taken place at the top of the draft. In the first four rounds, from ‘06-‘08, the Padres took HS players just four times: Kyler Burke, Drew Cumberland, Tommy Toledo (didn’t sign), and Jaff Decker. This year alone, they took three.

But, is it a change in philosophy?

It is easy to look at the past draft results and make some casual observations. It is less clear, however, to truly access the Padres strategy and whether or not it has changed. There are a few potential problems:

“Small sample” – We’re only talking about ten picks here this draft, of which the Padres opted to take four HS players. Even considering all the picks, there really isn’t a ton of data with which to make any substantial claims.

The high school/college distinction– The distinction between college and high school players is not always clear. Is a JC player closer to college or HS? Is a projectable, raw college athlete really the same as a four year college starter? When it comes down to it, each player is truly unique, and it is tough to separate them into four buckets.

A long term plan – Maybe the Padres plan all along was to stock up on college players and replenish the system with depth, then once that was complete, begin to draft higher upside, riskier high school athletes. It’s tough for us to tell, from the outside looking in.

While I’m not sure how much we can conclude based on one draft, I will say that I think it’s a good thing to add more elite high schoolers into the mix. Nick Schmidt, the Padres prospect we talked about earlier, after suffering season ending surgery short after joining the Padres organization, is still stuck in A ball (albeit, pitching well). Porcello, after spending one season in the minors, is already in the Tigers rotation, carrying a 3.98 ERA in 11 starts. He’s about to be worth a whole lot more than that $3.6 million the Tigers initially paid for him, and he’s only taken a couple of years to develop.

While it isn’t necessarily wise to look too much into one pick, the Schmidt/Porcello comparison offers a glimpse into the benefits of taking the talented high school player, and giving him a little more money than you’d like. Some people might criticize the $6 million-plus that Donavan Tate is going to command, but if he develops into the kind of player the Padres are expecting, it will be well worth the price. Hopefully, the Padres can get Tate, Williams, and Sampson signed, or else all of this optimism is premature.

****

Yes, I’m back! As Daniel previously mentioned, I’ve agreed to write an occasional post for Friar Forecast under the heading Myron’s Musings. I’m truly excited about that, as I think Daniel and company have made this into an even better Padres-hangout since my departure. If you can’t get enough of me, I’m also blogging on my own again, too.

by Daniel Gettinger

Paul DePodesta has a bit on the Padre’s most recent selections.  Fourth round pick Keyvius Sampson sounds particularly interesting.  He was ranked 47 on Baseball America’s top draft prospects.  Keith Law had him at 98; still good for a fourth round pick.  From DePodesta:

Keyvius is a very athletic right-handed starter with a fastball that ranges from 90-96 mph and a very good changeup. This season he posted a 0.83 ERA, pitching 59 innings, giving up 19 hits and 14 walks while striking out 113. We believe he has big upside as a starting pitcher.

ESPN also had an interesting article about Sampson’s difficult (off the field) sophomore year.

The Padres also selected pitchers in the 6th and 7th rounds: James Needy from Santana High School, and Miles Mikolas from Nova Southeastern.  Like third round pick Gerald Sullivan, both Needy and Mikolas are tall right handed pitchers that supposedly throw their fastball between 90 and 94 mph.

In the fifth round, the Padres nabbed Jason Hagerty, a catcher from the University of Miami.  Eighth round selection was Nate Freiman, a Duke first baseman that absolutely raked this season.  (Note: His previous seasons were not too shabby either).  Freiman is also very bright, as evidenced by his 3.92 Duke GPA.