by Daniel Gettinger

From an offensive perspective, players who get on base are good.  Players who hit for power are too. Players who both reach base frequently, and hit for power are really good.

Because a good measure of getting on base is on-base percentage (OBP), and a decent measure of power is slugging percentage (SLG), it has become somewhat mainstream to evaluate offensive performance by combining the two measures into OPS (OBP+SLG).

Unfortunately, adding SLG to OBP, while easy to calculate, is not an entirely accurate measure of offensive performance.  The main reason is OPS treats OBP and SLG as equals that are scaled in the same manner.  In fact, OBP is actually more important than SLG.  Given two players with the same OPS, the one with the higher OBP is better offensively.

Inside the Book Blog recently published an excerpt from PAAPFLY that illustrates the issue:

Continuing my bashing of Bengie Molina, allow me to show you how his terrible OBP can be quite detrimental. Bengie Molina posted a .727 OPS in 2009, which isn’t very good. Ryan Theriot managed to post an even lower OPS of .712 in 2009. He must be the inferior offensive player. Wrong. Molina’s wOBA is actually .308 to Theriot’s .318. Though Theriot slugged 73 points less than Molina, his OBP was 58 points higher, and, wOBA shows us that his 58 OBP points to Molina’s 73 slugging points were actually worth an additional 10 points in wOBA. This is just a quick example and a good way to illustrate just how much Molina’s extraordinary out making skills truly do hurt his team, offensively of course.

From a Padres’ perspective, I liken the Molina/Theriot example to that of Chase Headley and Kevin Kouzmanoff.  This is how Kouzmanoff and Headley stacked up in 2009:

	OBP	SLG	OPS	wOBA
Kouzmanoff	0.302	0.420	0.722	0.312
Headley	0.342	0.392	0.734	0.328

Although not a perfect example (because Headley’s OPS was slightly higher than Kouzmanoff’s OPS), we can see that Headley’s wOBA is 5% greater than Kouzmanoff’s wOBA, compared to only a 1.6% difference in OPS. The reason is Headley’s superior on base skills.

OPS is an okay estimate of offensive skill.  But the only advantage it has over a stat like wOBA, which properly weights OBP and OPS, is ease of calculability.  It would be nearly impossible to calculate a player’s wOBA based on the information given by the stadium scoreboard, or the Channel 4 stat-line.  However, outside of convenience, there is no good reason to use OPS.

by Myron Logan

Bloomberg Sports is launching new fantasy and professional baseball products. Today, they unveiled their products at their NYC headquarters, which had my Twitter page abuzz. David Appelman has some really cool screenshots at FanGraphs, including this one:

I’m not sure how much of what they are doing hasn’t already been done on the ‘net, but the presentation sure looks nice. Plus, the ability to easily toggle through all MLB players is a huge bonus. This is the major league product, so I don’t think we’ll be seeing much more of it. Sure is fun to look at, though.

by Myron Logan

Daniel analyzed the Jon Garland signing earlier, concluding:

Expected to perform at a $7MM level for only $5.3MM, Garland provides surplus value, at a position of need.  Not a bad signing.

Daniel is of course spot-on, and his approach to evaluating the deal is precisely how I would have looked at it. However, consider the question Aaron asked in today’s chat:

Why do you guys always use WAR as a universal stat. Aren’t wins worth more or less to different teams?

He makes a great point. A marginal win has a different value for each franchise. It is something that I’ve talked about along time ago, but neglected all too often. Let’s just consider one aspect; the team’s placement on the win curve. And just for the purposes of this post, let’s say the Padres were projected to win 79 games before acquiring Jon Garland. If you look at the chart in that linked post — Nate Silver’s wonderful research –a projected 79 win team has about a 12% chance of making the playoffs.

If we say that Garland’s addition adds two wins to the Padres projection, now they are an 81 win team. That increases their playoff chances by 6% — to a whopping 18%. If a playoff berth is worth $30 million — again, according to Silver, though obviously that figure is dated — Garland gets a $1.8 million playoff bonus. Now, are those two extra wins that he’s adding worth that remaining $3.5 million — the difference between Garland’s salary and the playoff bonus — without consider their impact on San Diego’s playoff chances.

Though Garland’s deal may have been a relative bargain, even in this year’s free agent market, the Padres are still paying a premium for his services. Due to his free agent status, and the fact that all teams can bid on him, his salary gets a major bump. Would the $5.3M the Padres gave Garland be better utilized on, say, locking up young players currently on the roster, future draft pick signing bonuses, international signings, and improving the scouting, player development, and analysis departments?

I don’t know the answer, but I think that consideration is definitely warranted. It is tough to criticize the Padres when they actually do spend money, putting them into a classic “damned if ya do, damned if ya don’t” situation. That said, their payroll sat at a mere $33 million before Garland’s acquisition, clearly showing that they are not necessarily trying to compete this season. Does it make sense to spend 13% of the payroll on one player, one player who likely is not going to change the season’s ultimate fate? Should they even be competing on the free agent market at this point?

Seriously, I ask questions because I don’t know the answers. $5.3 million is not going to cripple the franchise, but I’m just wondering if it could have been better spent elsewhere.

by Myron Logan

From a baseball perspective, I think $6 million is a slight overpay, at the least.
–Me, on Trevor Hoffman’s departure

Even by FanGraphs’ reliever valuations, which may be a bit conservative, Hoffman was worth almost $7 million last year. He had a tremendous comeback season with Milwaukee, posting a 1.83 ERA in 54 innings. In 2008, his final year with the Padres, he notched a 3.77 ERA in 45 innings. That season marked his lowest ERA since 1995 and the second lowest innings pitched total of his career.

With the Padres in rebuilding-mode and Hoffman limping into his age-41 season, it was time to part ways. Looking back, though, it may have been a bad move, considering Hoffman’s iconic status in San Diego, and obviously his production last year. What changed from 2008 to ‘09? Well, the first thing to remember is that relievers are especially hard to predict, because they are on the field so little, relative to position players and starters. A string of bad luck or poor performance (or, conversely, good luck or good performance) can mask a reliever’s true talent. Let’s take a look at some numbers:

Everything is very close, except home runs per nine innings. You could argue, though, that HR/9 is one of the most important predicators of a pitcher’s success. And a decrease in home run rate, from a well below average 1.6 to a miniscule .3, is going to have a tremendous impact on ones ERA.

What we’re talking about here, however, is only a few batted balls. In 2008, Hoffman gave up 58 fly balls, and eight of them traveled over the fence (13.7% HR/FB). In 2009, those numbers sat at 65 and two, respectively (3.1%). The league average for home runs per fly ball is right around 10%, however, Hoffman’s average from 2002-2009 is just 6% (2008 was his only year in that stretch over 10%). That may not seem that significant, but over that same period, had Hoffman’s HR/FB rate been at the league average, he would have allowed about 20 more home runs, or 2.5 per season – a not so insignificant number for a closer.

What this exemplifies, mainly, is the difficulty in projecting relievers. Had maybe four or five of Hoffman’s 2008 home runs landed on the playing field or in someone’s glove, his ERA could have easily been a point (or more) lower. It also shows that Trevor Hoffman, even at 41 years old, is still a great closer. He recently resigned with the Brewers for $8 million. While that may be a slight overpay, please, don’t quote me one it.

by Myron Logan

It was reported today that Kevin Kouzmanoff reached a $3.1 million deal with Oakland, avoiding arbitration.

Kouz is in his first year of arbitration, so, using Tango’s 40-60-80 rule, he should be expected to make about 40% of his free agent value. As we’ve discussed recently, Kouzmanoff has been very consistent, sitting right around 2.7 WAR for the last three years (via FanGraphs). Conservatively, let’s project him a 2.5 WAR this year with Oakland.

Now what we need is a dollars per win value, the amount teams are paying for wins on the free agent market. Previously, that number sat in the mid-to-high fours, and was rising 10% each year due to inflation. With the economic downfall, however, the market has corrected itself with teams now paying less money per win. Tangotiger informed me that he is using a $3.5 million value this year (increasing by .5M each year, going forward).

That means, on the free agent market, Kouz should make about $8.75M. Multiply that by 40% and we get $3.5M. It looks like the A’s got a pretty good deal, especially considering Kouzmanoff brings a gold glove reputation to the table that probably is not deserved.

Projecting out Kouz’s long term value, in terms of how much the A’s are saving over having to replace his performance on the free agent market, now looks like this:

Due to the lower dollar/win value, Kouzmanoff’s projected value falls about $3 million from my previous look.

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Corey Brock reported that the Padres could not reach an agreement with arbitration-eligible Scott Hairston today. Hairston is seeking $2.9 million, while the Padres come in at $2.1M. What is a fair price for Hairston? First we have to peg his value on the field, and that is a bit of a challenge since he’s been a role player for a while now, and has not logged a ton of PAs. His WAR values have hovered between 1.4 and 1.8 over the last three years; let’s go with 1.5 for this year.

On the free agent market, Hairston should make somewhere around $5.25M (1.5*$3.5) in 2010. Since he’s in his second year of arbitration, we estimate that he should make 60% of his free agent value, or $3.15. If the Padres get a deal done somewhere close to Hairston’s proposed 2.9M, they won’t be hurting themselves. Here is Hairston’s chart over the next two years in which he is under Padres control:

As I mentioned in the post on the trade, one of the reasons Kouzmanoff has a lot more surplus value than Hairston is because he is under team control for an extra year. The other, of course, is that he’s a better overall player.

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The Padres also reached a one year deal with Mike Adams that will pay the rightly reliever $1 million in 2010. Adams has done just about all you can ask in the majors, though he has only logged 171 MLB innings since 2004. His career ERA of 2.54 is tremendous, and he got it down under one last year. His peripherals – 9.1 K/9, 2.8 BB/9, .8 HR/9 – are also sparkling.

Of course, relievers are hard to project, especially ones that throw as few major league innings as Adams has. If we, I think somewhat optimistically, call him a 1 WAR player this year, he would be expected to earn $3.5 on the free agent market. Since he’s in his first year of arbitration, we multiply that figure by 40% and get $1.4M.

$1 million is not a steal by any means, but it looks like the Padres got a decent enough deal here. And, really, you can’t go wrong when you have a reliever with Adams’ ability and you’re only paying him $1 million on a one year deal. Worst case scenario, Adams gets injured and/or is completely ineffective and you lose $1 million. Best case, he repeats his past recent performance, and logs a lot of high leverage innings in front of Heath Bell.

by Myron Logan

Recently, I have been thinking about possible storylines for the upcoming season; what we are going to be watching. I think, for the most part, they involve sorting out the future of this team, and not necessarily winning games (though we will accept winning games, too).

I thought we could run through some different issues in separate posts, as sort of a disjointed season preview, touching on major topics (like where Adrian Gonzalez will play his games post all-star break) and micro ones (Cabrera’s fielding or Gwynn’s bat, for example).

Anyway, Everth Cabrera broke onto the scene with a surprising rookie year, making the huge jump from A-ball to the majors as a rule 5 pick. He not only stuck in the bigs, he clearly turned himself from borderline prospect to potential long-term contributor. He had shown plenty of offensive talent in the minors, so perhaps his season with the bat — .255/.342/.361 – should not have been that much of a surprise. He is not a power hitter, and probably will not turn into one, but he combines enough speed and patience to be a solid offensive contributor, especially at shortstop and in Pecto Park.

The CHONE projections, despite pegging him as nearly a league-average offensive player (again, quite a feat coming from a guy who had never played above A ball until last year), have him as a 1 WAR player next year. That is not bad, but it is not exactly earth-shattering either. Why so low? His fielding. CHONE projects his fielding to be 10 runs worse than the average shortstop next year. Considering that is a projection, and not raw numbers based on relatively few opportunities, it is somewhat disheartening.

UZR, available on FanGraphs as well, was also not a fan of Cabrera’s glove-work last year, putting him at nearly 12 runs below average. It was not just an error issue either, as he was equally bad in error runs and range runs (about –6 in each category). The only bright spot was his double play rating, which was just slightly above average.

For even further evidence of his defensive shortcomings, by the numbers, the data available at THT is also not encouraging. Cabrera came in last in the NL, among qualifiers, in RZR (plays in his zone turned into outs). His play out of his zone was respectable, but overall he still comes out well below average.

The good news is that Cabrera is young and talented, so these early numbers do not necessarily show who he is going to turn into on the defensive side of the ball. The other good news is that they may be wrong, or at least too pessimistic. Baseball America 2009 called Everth’s shift to short in 2008 “seamless,” and reported that he showed solid range and arm strength there. The Fans Scouting Report results were also positive, ranking Cabrera as the tenth best SS in the majors, and giving him excellent grades in “first few steps,” “speed”,” and “arm strength.”.

It is possible that the numbers do not represent his actual performance from last year; that due to whatever biases, they did not grade his fielding properly. It is also definitely possible that, despite a bad initial showing, he could develop into an average (even elite) fielder, with good coaching and hard work on his part. Of course, it is also possible that he just is not good with the glove.

Whether Everth Cabrera becomes a staple at the 6 hole for this Padres team may very well come down to what kind of value he ends up providing in the field. His development in this area of his game is something to keep a close eye on this year.

by Mike Rogers

Last winter I took three separate looks at the San Diego Padres 2008 draft. I had started adjusting college offensive statistics for parks and strength of schedule to get a better feel for the true talent levels of the players drafted. You can see my methods here in an article that Myron Logan and I penned for Baseball Analysts. I haven’t changed much except the weightings in my “Score” column since that article. My “Score” is a hodge-podge formula that weights adjusted wOBA, adjusted Isolated Power, a small speed score, K and BB%’s, and runs above average. The runs above average is above the average hitter in that particular conference using the conference’s average park and strength of schedule ratings.

Unfortunately for me, the 2009 draft wasn’t as loaded as the 2008 draft was with college bats. Furthermore, the Pads didn’t take as many college bats this passed June as they did in 2008, so my scope of adjusted numbers isn’t as high as my previous breakdown. But, let’s not drag this out any more. Presented in the order by which they were drafted, here are the college bats the Padres took last June (and signed) that are in my current system (which includes 13 conferences that are the ACC, SEC, Sun Belt, Big West, Big East, Big Ten, Big 12, Pac 10, MAC, WAC, West Coast Conference, Moutain West, Conference USA).

Evaluations after the jump. . . Read the rest of this entry »

by Myron Logan

There were some rumblings that the Padres were going to non-tender Kevin Correia, arguably their most valuable pitcher from a year ago, allowing him to become a free agent. However, the Pads reached a one year deal with Correia yesterday worth “about $3.6 million,” according to Corey Brock. Let’s take a look at some of Correia’s numbers, courtesy of FanGraphs:

In 2006 and ‘07, Correia was primarily a reliever with the Giants. 2008 was his first year as a full time starter, and obviously it did not go well. His fastball velocity, according to BIS, dropped about 1-2 MPH, perhaps contributing to the poor results. His strikeout rate declined and his homer rate increased, however, his BABiP was an abnormally high .340 – well above his career norm, which usually hovers around .300.

Last year with the Padres, Correia regained a couple of miles per hour on his fastball (and the rest of his pitches), saw an increase in his strikeout rate, a decrease in walks and homers, and put forth an all-around solid, if not spectacular, year. He was worth 2.4 Wins Above Replacement, by FanGraphs’ calculations, which easily led Padres starters.

Daniel was right on the money when he said that, “non-tendering Kevin Correia makes no sense.” It is not that Correia is a great pitcher; he is just too good of a player to let leave for nothing, and as Daniel says, he is not yet expected to be paid more than he is worth. Let’s take a closer look, though.

The projection systems are pegging Correia as about a 3.90-4.10 ERA pitcher next year, with a decrease in innings pitched. If we, somewhat conservatively, call him a 1.5 WAR pitcher, how much should he earn? Well, on the free agent market, if we put the $/WAR value at $4.4 million, we’d expect Correia to make somewhere around $6.6 million this year. If we use Tango’s 40-60-80 rule, which says a player in his last year of arbitration-eligibility should make 80% of his expected free agent value, then Correia should be paid ~$5.3 million ($6.6m * .80). That is assuming our 1.5 WAR projection; obviously that number goes up if we raise that projection, or down if we lower it.

Anyway, this appears to be a good deal for San Diego. They bring back one of their better pitchers at a reasonable price, and it is only a one year commitment. Like Daniel said, there is little risk involved here. Rather than losing a productive player and receiving nothing in return, the Padres retain Correia’s services for another year, and hold onto a potential chip who should bring some interest on the trade market.

Just a little shameless self-promotion from me today (and I normally don’t do this, but…). I joined the writing team over at Beyond the Boxscore, and my first article went up today evaluating the Jake Peavy trade last Friday.

I’d really like it if everyone that reads this would go there and read the entire thing, since it’ll please Padres fans to read the outcome. Thanks.