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The next Erubiel Durazo

Generally, I’m hesitant to compare prospects to established major leaguers. There are so many subtle differences in player skill-sets that, without exhaustive research, I’m never all that comfortable with the comparisons.

Yonder Alonso = Erubiel Durazo

After watching some video of Yonder Alonso, though, (notably the embedded one below from Scouting the Sally) I can’t help but think Erubiel Durazo.

At first, you might think that comparing a highly-touted first base prospect to Erubiel Durazo is my way of saying that I’m not overly high on Alonso, but that isn’t necessarily true. Upon reaching the majors at age 25, Durazo raked, and he didn’t stop until his major league career was over seven years later.

Note Durazo’s debut 1999 and Alonso’s 2011 in Cincinnati:

Player PA BA OBP SLG OPS+
Durazo 185 .329 .422 .594 153
Alonso 98 .330 .398 .545 154

Pretty similar starts, though I certainly don’t mean to imply that I’m comparing these two players based on such a small amount of performance data. As mentioned, Alonso’s swing and movements simply remind me of Durazo, and it conveniently fits the narrative that the numbers are very similar.

Physically, they are similar too. Durazo is listed at 6’3’’, 240 on Baseball-Reference. Alonso: 6’2’’, 240. Both left-handed hitters. Durazo ended up hitting .281/.381/.487 in his major league career, split between Arizona and Oakland. Alonso has posted inferior numbers so far in his career (.292/.370/.466) – and that’s in the minor leagues.

Durazo played in Mexico prior to the majors and only spent part of one season in the minors before debuting in Arizona, so we can’t really compare minor league stats. He hit .404/.489/.703 that year in Double-A and Triple-A.

In the field, Durazo provided limited defensive value at first (he was traded to Oakland and became a DH) and he wasn’t particularly fast or athletic. The scouting reports on Alonso are similar. He’s not out there for his defense or base running.

Scouting or performance

Let’s face it, Alonso’s scouting reputation far exceeds his actual performance thus far. Based on the numbers, Clay Davenport* projects Alonso as a .260/.335/.400 hitter in his prime. That isn’t bad, especially in Petco, but it isn’t really what we are expecting out of the Padres new first basemen.

*Davenport adjusts raw minor league statistics for league, age, park effects, and various other factors to get a better estimate of the player’s major league potential.

Yonder Alonso = Adrian Gonzalez

Finishing where we started, PECOTA currently lists Adrian Gonzalez as Alonso’s number one comparable player. Number two: Jeff Clement.

Interestingly enough, there might be something to the Alonso-Gonzalez comp. Though Gonzalez was always young(er) for his league, both players put up underwhelming minor league statistics (but were highly-rated amongst scouts). Gonzalez, of course, blossomed into the player we had the pleasure of watching in San Diego for five seasons.

Then again, there is probably something to the Alonso-Clement comp, too.

As you know, there’s a large degree of uncertainty in player evaluation, especially prospects. Here’s hoping Alonso turns out more like Gonzalez than Clement. But I’ll settle for Durazo.

Thoughts on losing Simon Castro

When the San Diego Padres acquired Carlos Quentin from the Chicago White Sox, they gave up a couple of pitching prospects in Simon Castro and Pedro Hernandez. We’ve already discussed the trade in general, so now let’s focus more on Castro.

Right hander Simon Castro was signed as an international free agent out of the Dominican Republic back in 2006. He was quite raw, obviously, and didn’t really burst onto the big time prospect scene until after his 2009 campaign at Single-A Fort Wayne.

Castro pitched 140 and a third innings that year, posting a 3.33 ERA, 10.1 K/9, 2.4 BB/9, and .6 HR/9. Those are some pretty solid numbers, especially for a 21-year-old who had yet to really put it all together previously. After the impressive season, Castro ranked as the 57th best prospect in baseball by Baseball America, the #2 Padres prospect by Kevin Goldstein, and the #2 Padres prospect by John Sickels.

Sickels called Castro an “excellent arm with improving command” and Goldstein said that “he will be an above-average major-league starter, with some scouts projecting him as high as a No. 2.”

in 2010, Castro jumped up to Double-A San Antonio and continued to perform. He again pitched 140 innings (10 and a third in Triple-A Portland), with a 3.28 ERA, 7.3 K/9, 2.6 BB/9, and .6 HR/9. The drop in strikeouts was a bit alarming, but overall the 6-5 right hander had a more-than-respectable year in his first taste of Double-A.

The prospectors didn’t waver. Baseball America rated him as the 58th best MLB prospect while Kevin Goldstein and John Sickels both kept him at #2 overall in the Padres system.

Last season Castro started out in Triple-A Tucson and lasted only six starts, posting an ERA over 10 and ugly peripherals. He was sent back down to Double-A San Antonio where he would regain some of his form. His ERA was 4.33, but as we mentioned in the Quentin trade analysis, his peripherals looked largely the same:

Year Inn K/PA BB/PA BABiP FIP
2010 129.7 20.2% 6.8% .271 3.34
2011 89.3 19.5% 4.3% .321 3.80

One could argue pretty easily that he was actually a little better the second time around in Double-A, as his strikeout rate stayed virtually the same and his walk rate dropped quite a bit. His strikeout-to-walk ratio jumped from 2.97 in 2010 to 4.56 in 2011.

Of course, there are some legitimate reasons to be concerned with Castro’s 2011 year. For one, he struggled mightily again in Triple-A, giving him a 9.50 ERA, 1.5 HR/9, and nearly one walk for every strikeout in 36 career innings. It’s a small sample, sure, but it is ugly performance. Further, he repeated Double-A and while his peripherals were a little better, it’s not as if he dominated.

After 2011, though, would you expect him to completely drop off the prospect radar? That’s kind of what happened. Baseball America didn’t list Castro in its Padres top 10, Kevin Goldstein rated him #20 in the system, and John Sickels didn’t even rank him in his top 27.

Now, prospect lists are certainly fluid, and Castro didn’t do much to build on his 2010 campaign. Further, the Padres continued to add minor league talent from the draft and trades, helping push Castro’s freefall – not to mention, other guys establishing themselves.

Still, if you’re trying to look at the whole picture, it’s hard to believe that Castro should have fallen this far based on his ‘11 performance. If he was a top three prospect prior to 2011, there’s no way he’s a top 20-30 prospect after. That’s only my opinion, of course, and the prospect experts certainly study these guys closer than I do and have a lot of scout/front office contacts.

The general point, though, is not about prospect lists. Instead, the concern is over what Castro could still become. We’ve talked a lot recently about the Padres depth in the minor leagues. Castro was kind of a guy who embodied that depth. Formerly a highly-regarded prospect, there he was sitting way down — all but forgotten — on our organization depth chart.

Castro is gone now and while we received Carlos Quentin for him (and Hernandez), at this point it’s not clear that the acquisition was worth the potential cost.

Karsten Whitson, Padres first round pick

The San Diego Padres picked Karsten Whitson in the first round of the 2010 MLB draft, 9th overall. Whitson is a 6-4, 195 lb right-handed starter from Chipley High School in Florida.

The risk that is the HS pitcher

Before getting into Whitson, specifically, let’s talk about high school pitchers in general. The general consensus is that prep pitchers have the most risk of any type of draft prospect (HS pitchers, HS bat, college pitchers, college bat). Take a look at this chart, created by Sky Andrecheck at Baseball Analysts, and based off his draft WAR model:

draft chart 

The chart says that  high school pitchers, selected toward the top of the draft, have about a 30% chance of at least reaching the majors and contributing 1 WAR through their career. You can see that that figure is lower than the other three types of players, and the trend continues as you scan down the chart and raise expectations. This chart shows us that high school pitchers are least likely to make any impact at the major league level, and that their ceilings are actually *lower* – on average — than their college and position player counterparts.

In other words, high school pitchers are dangerous. Importantly, however, the data suggest that the risk might not be worth the reward, as they don’t offer a higher upside either.

Here are all high school pitchers selected in the top 15 picks, from 1999 through 2006:

Year Player # Org. RH/LH WAR
1999 Josh Beckett 2 Bos RH 23.5
1999 Bobby Bradley 8 Pit RH -
1999 Brett Myers 12 Phi RH 7.4
1999 Ty Howington 14 Cin LH -
1999 Jason Stumm 15 Chi RH -
2000 Mike Stodolka 4 KC LH -
2000 Matt Harrington 7 Col RH -
2000 Matt Wheatland 8 Det RH -
2000 Mark Phillips 9 SD LH -
2000 Joe Torres 10 Ana LH -
2001 Gavin Floyd 4 Phi RH 5.6
2001 Colt Griffin 9 KC RH -
2001 Mike Jones 12 MIl RH -
2002 Chris Gruler 3 Cin RH -
2002 Zack Greinke 6 KC RH 20.5
2002 Scott Kazmir 15 NYM LH 18.1
2003 John Danks 9 Tex LH 12.1
2004 Mark Rogers 5 Mil RH -
2004 Homer Bailey 7 Cin RH -1.4
2006 C. Kershaw 7 LA LH 4.9
2006 Kasey Kiker 12 Tex LF -

Thanks to Baseball Reference for the data.

You’ve got a number of hits (Beckett, Greinke, Kazmir, Kershaw) and a bunch of misses. You may notice another trend, too. There were 10 HS pitchers taken in the first 15 picks between the 1999 and 2000 drafts. From 2001 through 2006, however, there were only 11 taken. It appears that teams were getting a little more selective with prep arms, as they better realized the risk.

Karsten Whitson is not Mark Phillips

One of the problems with this type of analysis is that we are lumping players together. Sure, “high school pitchers” is a convenient enough category – and it obviously makes a good deal of sense – but we have to recognize that all high school pitchers are not the same, and frankly many of them are not even similar, taking into account size, stuff, command, make-up, etc. .

Perhaps the Padres have selected their Josh Beckett, Zack Greinke, or Jake Peavy here. Maybe they haven’t. It’s close to impossible to tell, especially when you don’t have access to the scouting reports and first hand knowledge that the Padres and some draft experts do.

That said, that is not going to stop us from discussing Whitson, and trying to form some type of opinion on his future in the Padres organization.

Basic facts

Karsten Whitson, RHP
Chipley HS, FLA
6-4, 190
Commitment: Florida
Stats: 7-3, 123 strikeouts, 55 innings (senior season)

Scouting Report

Drawing off the excellent scouting report available at PNR Scouting, Whitson offers the following pitches:

Fastball – Sits in low-90s, can reach 94-95. Good movement. Can add velocity with improved strength/altering mechanics. Only issue is control.

Slider – Low-80s power slider. Plus pitch. Needs to work on control/command.

Change-up – Low-80s. Work in progress, but has potential to be solid offering.

Here’s a good report on his mechanics, from Amazin’ Avenue:

Issue number two concerns his mechanics. If you watch him from the side, pay attention to how he lands on his left leg. Ideally, the pitcher lands on it softly, with the knee bent a little less than 90 degrees. In Whitson’s case, he’s landing stiffly, immediately pushing up with his leg as he lands. What’s the big deal? It implies three issues, none of which are huge deals for Whitson. First, it can impair a pitcher’s control, due to the leg forcing his body away from his momentum at the moment of release. Whitson’s command is pretty good as is (but maybe it can be better). Second, a great stride shouldn’t allow you to land anything but softly. It may be that Whitson can get a little more power from his stride, either adding velocity to his fastball or taking a little stress off his shoulder. And third, Whitson’s follow-through is a little short, and I’m pretty sure the stiff leg is the reason. A good follow-through can act almost like an energy sink, allowing the pitcher’s arm to decelerate as safely as possible. If cut prematurely, it can shock the pitcher’s shoulder a second time, adding recoil to the delivery. Lengthening Whitson’s stride just a little might solve all three potential problems.

And a couple of videos of Whitson:

 

The consensus opinion

Here’s a chart showing where various draft experts rank Whitson:

Expert Rank
Keith Law 5
Baseball America 12
John Sickels 9
PNR Scouting 3
Lincoln Hamilton 6

Overall, Whitson is obviously a highly regarded pitching prospect. The questions regarding his development are questions that follow most any young pitching prospect. Can he handle 200 innings down the road? Can he add a few MPH with improved mechanics and/or strength and conditioning? Can he refine his mechanics and avoid injury? Can he improve his command/control?

The Padres obviously believe that he has a good chance to develop into a solid pitcher, as they spent a high pick on him and will likely have to pony up above-slot dollars to sign him away from his Florida commitment. We’ll be rooting for him. 

Draft always critical for Padres

Though the rule 4 amateur draft may not receive as much national publicity as, say, the NFL variety, its importance is certainly understood in baseball circles. In an age where massive payroll disparities exist between franchises, the easiest way for financially-challenged teams – like the San Diego Padres — to compete is to out-draft, and out-develop, the big spenders.

Developing home grown talent is vital because a players first six years are spent under team control, at a tremendously discounted rate. Let us take, for example, an average player and estimate how much surplus value he’ll accrue in his first six years under team-control:

Year WAR Est. Salary FA Salary Surplus Value
2012 2 WAR $.4M $9M $8.6M
2013 2 $.5M $10M $9.5M
2014 2 $.6M $11M $10.4M
2015 2 $4.8M $12M $7.2M
2016 2 $7.8M $13M $5.2M
2017 2 $11.2M $14M $2.8M
Total 12 $25.3M $69M $43.7

To clarify, we have an average (2 WAR) player. His Free Agent salary is estimated by multiplying his WAR by the marginal value of a win (~$4.5M in 2012 and escalating $.5M each year). His actual salary is estimated by near-minimum totals for his first three years, and then using the 40%-60%-80% scale, which models how much arbitration-eligible players are paid, when compared to their FA value.

So, if a team can draft and develop an average player, not at all a superstar, it is looking at $40+ million in surplus value over the players first six years – in other words, a tremendous asset to the organization. This is a player that will provide three years of average play for peanuts, and then another three years of average play at 60% of his market value. Overall, this club gets $69 million worth of production for $25.3 million. Add in a signing bonus, minor league salaries, and some developmental fees, and you’re still looking at a great value.

If a team can draft a star player like Evan Longoria, well, it is that much better off. Longoria has already netted the Rays some $50+ million in surplus value in his first two seasons. The Rays went on to sign Longoria to an extension that could be worth $44 million over nine years. They have their cornerstone player locked up at a very reasonable price, thanks to the draft and MLB’s salary dynamics.

Dollars and sense

The draft might sound perfect for its efforts in leveling the playing field between big market and small market franchises. That is its intent, but there is at least one small problem. There is no slot-requirement, and some players that may be top talents are bypassed by small market teams because of signability issues – teams are concerned that, after drafting the player, they won’t be able to sign him to a deal.

A good example is the 2007 draft. Back in the infancy of this blog, as Rick Porcello continued to go unselected (due to aforementioned $ concerns, not talent) , I was hoping the Padres would pick him at #23. The Padres passed, taking Nick Schmidt, who signed at estimated slot money — $1.26 million. Porcello fell into the hands of the Tigers five picks later, who signed for $3.58 million — $2.4 million above slot-recommendation.

Of course, I understood that the Padres were unlikely to take Porcello. After all, they weren’t the only team that passed on him, and they didn’t exactly have that kind of money to throw at a prep pitcher – even, a very good one. However, my theory went that, yes, they would be spending a few million dollars more than desired, but the potential value Porcello could provide later on would be well worth it.

Porcello debuted with the Tigers last year and, conveniently for this article, delivered a league-average season (1.9 WAR). He was worth approximately $8 million in surplus value. He has struggled a bit this season, but his peripheral numbers actually look fine (sans the K-rate), and the Tigers have a solid pitcher locked up under team-control.

It doesn’t work like that every time, kid

The draft is an inherently risky process. Trying to evaluate young players and project what they will become in four or five years is both art and science – and a lot of headaches. Sure, there’s a correlation between draft slot and WAR, but it isn’t a great one. There are no-brainers (A-Rod, Longoria, Strasburg), but there are also countless busts (ie, no-brainers that didn’t work out). The obligatory Matt Bush mentioned comes now.

The Padres may very well have thrown $3.6 million Rich Porcello’s way, if they knew exactly how he was going to develop. But, perhaps their analysis concluded that there was, maybe, a 40% or 50% chance that he wouldn’t give them any MLB value. In the end, maybe he was too risky. Nobody wants $3.6 million to go to waste, especially when there are plenty of other attractive options to choose from.

The draft is critical for all teams. But if the Padres – and other small-mid-level market teams – want to compete, it is almost essential that they draft and develop well. Producing home grown players would give the Padres a (cheap) core to build around, allowing them to add to it with some good trade acquisitions and solid free agent signings. The past era of Padres baseball has been filled with a mixed bag of drafts – some good, a lot not so good. But overall, they missed out too many times when they had a plethora of high picks.

It is critical that this regime not only evaluate talent well, but also not be afraid to spend the extra dollar. If the Padres are confident in their ability to evaluate a draft class – and they should be, with all the brainpower in the front office – then they shouldn’t be worried about spending that extra money. In the long run, it will be money well spent.

Padres Minor League News and Notes

After only twelve games it is hard to make many assumptions or judgments as to the fate of the 2010 San Diego Padres’ farm teams. One thing I can say is that at this early point in the season the pitchers are well ahead of the hitters. That said, here is a look at some positives, negatives, and other observations twelve games into the season.

Portland Beavers (5-7); 3rd place (1 GB)

Positives- Batting: Craig Cooper didn’t even make the opening day lineup. Since then has hit .375/.405/.650 while leading the team in RBI (10) and 2nd in RS (7). Too bad he is a 1B… Denorfria and Mike Baxter have also gotten off to hot starts each hitting over .370…Durango has been on base 16 times this season and has 9 SB.

Pitching: Carrillo (9.2 IP, 0.93 ERA, 1.03 WHIP) and Inman (10 IP, 2.70 ERA, 1.00 WHIP 9 K) are beginning to put themselves back on the prospect map while anchoring the rotation…The Beavers have 4 relievers Frieri, Webb, Worrell, and Burke each with WHIP’s under 1.00, while all having at least an 8 K/9 IP average.

Negatives- Offense: Lance Zawadzki was/is competing for a job in SD has only hit .205/.286/.227 thus far with 3 E and 15 K (44 AB). ..Cunningham and Durango have not been terrible but have not come close to the hype they deservedly received during ST. Both are hitting around .260 with a .300 OBP...Barfield was only 3-18 before being put on the DL.

Pitching: No real negatives outside of the ERAs of Leblanc (7.20) and Russel (11.57). Of course both have come to SD and been lights out.

Notes: The team is sorely missing Antonelli, as the 2B spot has not produced much of anything this year. 8 of the 12 games have been decided by the bullpen (4-4), Beavers are also 2-4 in games decided by 1 run.

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